

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

USIE-00 EB-07 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 ERDE-00 NRC-05 /095 W
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O R 241050Z OCT 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4214

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5791

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: OPTION III: EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS: SPC MEETING
OCOTBER 23

REFS: A) USNATO 5618 DTG 161034Z OCT 75; B) STATE 248364 DTG
180119Z OCT 75

SUMMARY: SPC DISCUSSION OF OPTION III OCTOBER 23 CONCENTRATED ON
US PROPOSAL ON RESPONSE TO EARLY EASTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT
NON-US EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS (OTHER ASPECTS OF MEETING REPORTED
SEPTEL). FRG AND BELGIUM, CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN INTACT THEIR
POSITION THAT IF THE EAST PRESSES, THE ALLIES MUST TELL
THE EAST THAT LIMITATIONS ON NON-US EQUIPMENT ARE UNACCEPTABLE,
RATHER THAN DEFERRING THE QUESTION UNTIL THEY HAVE RECEIVED
AN INSTRUCTED EASTERN RESPONSE ON THE MAIN PROPOSAL. ACTION
REQUESTED: SEE PARA 13 BELOW. END SUMMARY.

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1. FRG REP (HOYNCK) AGAIN QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR UK FOOTNOTE
IN PARA 4 OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE (TEXT IN REF A), WHICH SAID THAT
THE HANDLING OF A DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST ON CONSTRAINTS WILL BE
ADDRESSED IN A SEPARATE PAPER. UK REP (BAILES) SAID THAT FOOTNOTE

WAS SUPERSEDED BY THE FACT THAT THERE PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE A SEPARATE TACTICS PAPER, SO THE FOOTNOTE COULD BE DROPPED. ITALIAN RE (CIARRAPICO) NOTED HIS INTEREST IN A SEPARATE PAPER. NETHERLANDS REP (MEESMAN) SAID THERE WAS NO NEED FOR SUCH A PAPER. (COMMENT: WE BELIEVE THE IDEA OF A SEPARATE PAPER HAS PROBABLY BEEN PUT TO REST.)

2. THE REMAINDER OF THE DISCUSSION ON EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS CENTERED ON THE US PROPOSAL ON PARA 5 OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE (PARA 3, REF B). THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THAT PARA WHICH EMERGED FROM THE MEETING (EXPLANATION OF THE ALTERNATIVES IS CONTAINED LATER IN THIS MESSAGE).

3. BEGIN TEXT (SQUARE BRACKETS ARE REPRESENTED BY PARENTHESIS):

AS NECESSARY TO MEET EASTERN PRESSURE, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES OF WHAT ARMAMENTS SHOULD BE LIMITED AND THE NATURE OF SUCH LIMITATIONS ONLY AFTER THE PRINCIPLES OF THE REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY EXPLORED. THEY SHOULD TELL THE EAST THAT THEY ARE NOT WILLING TO GO INTO THIS DIFFICULT ISSUE IN ANY WAY UNTIL (THEY HAVE RECEIVED AN INSTRUCTED RESPONSE AS TO WHETHER THE EAST IS WILLING TO CONSIDER POSITIVELY (THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF) THE ALLIED PROPOSAL) OR (THIS EXPLORATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED). FURTHERMORE, BECAUSE (THE ENTIRE ISSUE OF ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS) (THE ISSUES OF WHAT ARMAMENTS SHOULD BE LIMITED AND THE NATURE OF SUCH LIMITATION) (IS) (ARE) HIGHLY COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT, SUCH A DISCUSSION COULD PREMATURELY SIDETRACK THE NEGOTIATION INTO DETAIL. IF FURTHER PRESSED CONCERNING (LIMITATIONS ON) NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT, THE ALLIES SHOULD MAKE CLEAR AS APPROPRIATE THAT (NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT IS NOT PART OF THE ALLIED OFFER) OR (LIMITATIONS ON NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIANCE) OR (THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE LIMITATIONS ON NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENTS WOULD BE THOSE RESULTING (IN PRACTICE) FROM COLLECTIVE LIMITS ON ALLIED AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA). END TEXT

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4. FRG REP BEGAN THE DISCUSSION OF THE US PROPOSAL, WHICH HAD BEEN INTRODUCED AT THE LAST MEETING, BY STATING THAT IT WAS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, AND FRG COULD ACCEPT THE FIRST TWO SENTENCES. HOWEVER, THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH THE LAST SENTENCE (ON MAKING CLEAR THAT NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT "IS NOT PART OF THE NATO OFFER"). IT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE STRONGER IN SOME WAY, BUT HE DID NOT YET HAVE LANGUAGE. IN ADDITION, FRG STILL SUPPORTS THE FIRST BRACKETED PHRASE IN PARA 10 OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE, WHICH SAYS THAT "IF AT ANY POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AFTER THE POINTS IN PARA 5 ABOVE HAVE BEEN MADE, "THE EAST ASKS FOR LIMITATIONS ON NON-US EQUIPMENT, THE AHG SHOULD ANSWER THAT SUCH LIMITATIONS ARE UNACCEPTABLE. HE SAID BONN DOES NOT CONSIDER IT A VIABLE TACTIC

TO TRY TO KEEP THE OTHER SIDE "FOGGY" ABOUT NON-US ALLIED
EQUIPMENT. IT IS ESSENTIAL, IF THE OTHER SIDE STILL ASKS
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT AFTER INITIAL
ALLIED STALLING, THAT THE AHG CLEARLY STATE THE ALLIED POSITION.

5. BELGIAN REP (WILLOT) SAID THE US TEXT PERMITTED BELGIUM TO
DROP THE FIRST BRACKETED PHRASE IN PARA 5 ("WHICH GIVE RISE TO
LIMITATION"), AND TO ACCEPT THE FINAL BRACKETED PHRASE IN PARA 10
("THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE LIMITATIONS..."). HOWEVER, BELGIUM STILL
HAD DIFFICULTIES WITH REFERENCE TO SIMPLY "THE BASIC ELEMENTS"
OF THE ALLIED PROPOSAL, RATHER THAN LANGUAGE IN PARA 6, WHICH
HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED WITH SUCH DIFFICULTY ("THE BASIC ELEMENTS AS
CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 1"). THIS PROBLEM COULD BE AVOIDED BY
DELETING IN THE SECOND SENTENCE OF THE US PROPOSAL EVERYTHING
AFTER "UNTILZN AND REPLACING IT SIMPLY BY "THIS EXPLORATION HAS
BEEN COMPLETED". HE PROPOSED INSERTING "LIMITATIONS ON" IN THE
SENTENCE (SEE PARA 3 ABOVE). ALSO, THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THE
US PROPOSAL (THAT NON-US ALLIED EQUIPMENT IS NOT PART OF THE
OFFER) COULD LEAD THE OTHER SIDE TO THINK THAT NON-US ALLIED
EQUIPMENT COULD BE LIMITED IN PHASE II, SINCE THE ALLIED OFFER
ONLY CONCERNS PHASE I. THEREFORE, BELGIUM WOULD PREFER EITHER OF
TWO ALTERNATIVES TO THIS PHRASE, I.E. THE TWO FINAL ALTERNATIVES
IN PARA 3 ABOVE. (WITHIN THE FINAL ALTERNATIVE, "IN PRACTICE" IS
BRACKETED AT REQUEST OF ITALIAN REP AT A PREVIOUS MEETING, A
REQUEST WHICH UK STATED IS COULD ACCEPT.) BELGIAN REP STATE
THAT THE FINAL ALTERNATIVE WITHOUT BRACKETS AROUND "IN PRACTICE"
WOULD ENABLE BELGIUM TO DROP THE PRESENT BRACKETED SENTENCE IN
PARA 5 THAT LIMITATIONS ON MANPOWER OFFER SUFFICIENT REASSURANCE
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AGAINST SIGNIFICANT EQUIPMENT INCREASES.

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ERDA-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00

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O R 241050Z OCT 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4215X

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BONN
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USNMR SHAPE
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6. US REP (MOORE) POINTED OUT THAT THE US DID NOT HOPE TO KEEP THE OTHER SIDE "FOGGY" ABOUT NON-US EQUIPMENT ALONE, PER THE FRG INTERVENTION, BUT WANTED TO DEFER THE DISCUSSION OF THE WHOLE EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS ISSUE. THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT POINT. ONCE THE ALLIES STARTED TALKING ABOUT NON-US EQUIPMENT, THE EAST WOULD FOCUS ON NON-US EQUIPMENT, AS WELL AS THE REST OF THE EQUIPMENT ISSUES. THE ALLIES WOULD BE IN THE MIDST OF A DISCUSSION NOT OF THE MAIN PROPOSAL, BUT OF CEILINGS AND CONSTRAINTS. HE REITERATED THE ADVANTAGES OF TRYING TO TEST EASTERN REACTION TO OPTION III AT FULL STRENGTH. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IF THE AHG DEVELOPED ITS POSITION ACCORDING TO THE US PROPOSAL IN PARA 5, WITH THIS POSITION RECORDED IN THE NEGOTIATING RECORD, THE OTHER SIDE WOULD HAVE NO LEGITIMATE CLAIM THAT THE ALLIES HAD INDICATED WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ANY KIND OF LIMITATION ON ANY KIND OF EQUIPMENT OF ANY COUNTRY.

7. CANADIAN REP (BARLEMEN) WELCOMED THE US GENERAL APPROACH. HOWEVER, THE FINAL SENTENCE DID NOT APPEAR IN ACCORDANCE WITH
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US DESIRE TO DEFER THE ISSUE. HE AGREED WITH BELGIAN REP THAT SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE ABOUT THE PHRASE "THE BASIC ELEMENTS" AND HE PROPOSED DELETING IT. ITALIAN REP ALSO WANTED THIS PHRASE DELETED. US REP REITERATED THAT REFERENCE TO "THE BASIC ELEMENTS" OF THE PROPOSAL IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EAST WAS TO AVOID REFERENCE TO PARAGRAPH NUMBERS, BUT THE AGREEMENT IN PARA 6 REMAINED.

8. NETHERLANDS REP WONDERED, IF THE US COULD PROPOSE ITS FINAL SENTENCE THAT NON-US EQUIPMENT IS NOT PART OF THE ALLIED OFFER, WHY THE US COULD NOT GO A STEP FURTHER AND SAY THAT NON-US EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS WERE UNACCEPTABLE. US REP REPLIED THAT THE REASON WAS THAT SUCH A BLANKET STATEMENT WAS NOT NECESSARY, AND WOULD SURELY RESULT IN A LONG, EARLY DISCUSSION OF CEILINGS AND LIMITATIONS ISSUES, INSTEAD OF A DISCUSSION OF THE MAIN PROPOSAL.

9. ITALIAN REP OPPOSED THE PHRASE "THE ENTIRE ISSUE OF ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS" AS PERHAPS IMPLYING MORE LIMITATIONS THAN THE ALLIES ACTUALLY INTENDED. UK REP NOTED THAT THE PHRASE ALREADY APPROVED BY SPC WAS "THE ISSUES OF WHAT ARMAMENTS SHOULD BE LIMITED AND THE NATURE OF SUCH LIMITATION". SHE SUGGESTED REPLACING THE PHRASE IN QUESTION BY THIS PHRASE AS A MEANS OF MEETING THE ITALIAN PROBLEM, AND THIS IS REFLECTED IN THE TEXT

IN PARA 3 ABOVE.

10. UK REP WELCOMED THE US COMPROMISE, BUT DID NOT COMMENT ON IT EXCEPT AS IN PARA 9 ABOVE. SHE NOTED THAT UK BELIEVES THAT THERE MAY BE SOME CASES WHERE IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO GIVE THE EAST AN EARLY RESPONSE ON ALL EQUIPMENT ISSUES, IF THIS WERE NECESSARY TO OBTAIN AN INSTRUCTED RESPONSE FROM THE EAST.

11. COMMENT: FRG AND BELGIUM HAVE NOT CHANGED THEIR FUNDAMENTAL POSITION IN THE LEAST RE ALLIED RESPONSE TO EARLY EASTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT NON-US EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS. ALTHOUGH FRG HAS NOT STATED EXACTLY WHAT IT WOULD DO WITH THE FINAL SENTENCE IN THE US PROPOSAL FOR PARA 5, FRG INSISTENCE ON THE FIRST BRACKETED PHRASE IN PARA 10 MAINTAINS THE FRG POSITION IN ITS ENTIRETY.

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13. REGARDING SPECIFIC DRAFTING PROPOSALS AT THIS MEETING (SEE PARA 3 ABOVE), WE SUGGEST ACCEPTANCE OF THE BELGIAN PHRASE "THIS EXPLORATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED" AS A MEANS OF RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF REFERRING TO "THE BASIC ELEMENTS" OF THE ALLIED PROPOSAL. WE ALSO SUGGEST ACCEPTANCE OF THE UK PHRASE "THE ISSUES OF WHAT ARMAMENTS SHOULD BE LIMITED AND THE NATURE OF SUCH LIMITATION". WE ASSUME BELGIAN PHRASE "LIMITATIONS ON" IS ACCEPTABLE. END COMMENT.

13. ACTION REQUESTED: IN TIME FOR SPC MEETING MONDAY, OCTOBER 27: GUIDANCE PER PARA 12 ABOVE.
BRUCE

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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